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Fresh data on English grain yields 1268-1480 are combined with revised price series to measure the frequency and scale of serious harvest shortfalls and estimate the elasticity of demand for cereals. Major food availability declines are shown to have been a significant component of most historical subsistence crises, as back-to-back shortfalls were of the worst famines. Although farmers did achieve some reduction in yield variance c.1400 to c.1800, serious harvest shortfalls long remained an unavoidable fact of economic life. England's progressive escape from famine therefore arose primarily from improved market integration coupled with more effective protection of the entitlements of the poor.
I. INTRODUCTION
How common were serious harvest shortfalls in Europe in the past? How often did they lead to subsistence crises and when, if ever, to outright famine? For want of hard demographic and agricultural output evidence, historians have often used extreme price variations to infer the frequency and magnitude of serious harvest shortfalls. Annual and even higher frequency cereal price series dating back to the Middle Ages are relatively plentiful. They are, however, by no means always easy to interpret in isolation, because the link between price and food supply in the past is poorly documented and controversial. Although high prices were usually 1 Research funding has been provided by the Economic and Social Research Council (Award RES-000-23-0645), British Academy, Sussex Archaeological Society, and Leverhulme Trust.
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Thanks are also due to Morgan Kelly for advice and critical comment. associated with harvest deficits, they could also -to a greater or lesser extentreflect intervening military, monetary, market, distribution, and demand-side factors. Nor did low prices always necessarily mean that harvests were adequate.
The scale and duration of extreme price rises has also varied between crops, countries and time periods. How, for example, should the doubling of the real price of wheat in England between 1594 and 1597 be related to the three-fold rise in the real price of rice in Bengal in 1770 or the quadrupling of potato prices in Ireland between 1845 and 1847 (at a time when those of wheat and oats rose only 30 and 50 per cent)?
This paper combines new price and crop-yield datasets for medieval England to examine explicitly the relationship between harvests and prices at a relatively early stage in Europe's economic development. The price dataset has been assembled by Gregory Clark and incorporates and supersedes those constructed by both Henry Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins and by David Farmer. 2 The yield dataset has been assembled by Bruce Campbell and amalgamates the work of several other historians. 3 It relates exclusively to output on large-scale demesne farms employing hired and servile labor directly managed by or for lords and is geographically representative of the core regions of arable production in southern 2 Clark's prices are available at: [WWW document] URL: http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/data.php. The correlations between year-to-year differences in the Clark and Farmer ("Prices and Wages," 1988 and 1991) series for 1269-1481 are 0.978 for wheat, 0.920 for barley, and 0.823 for oats. A revised and corrected Phelps Brown and Hopkins crop price series has also been made available by Munro, Revisions. 3 Full details are given in Campbell, Three Centuries. and eastern England, home to well over half the population. 4 Notwithstanding that manorial farms differed from smallholdings in terms of cultivation techniques, capital investment, and crop choice, high correlations between demesne yields and aggregate tithe receipts from all grain producers indicate that crop-specific year-toyear fluctuations in yields were broadly similar under both regimes. 5 Although the data range chronologically from the 1210s to the 1490s, annual coverage is only continuous from 1268 to 1480 and it is consequently upon the latter period that analysis is here concentrated. 6 The dataset comprises the single largest body of English yield observations prior to the advent of agricultural statistics in 1867
(livestock numbers and crop acreages) and 1884 (crop yields), and in volume, 4 Campbell, English Seigniorial Agriculture. 5 Campbell, "Four Famines". 6 Postan (Medieval Economy, and Titow (Winchester Yields, attached great significance to the pre-1268 yield data, almost all of it from the vast estates of the bishops of Winchester in southern England, since the exceptionally high yields ostensibly achieved on some demesnes appeared to support their hypothesis that arable husbandry subsequently succumbed to a productivity crisis brought on by over-cultivation and a mounting agronomic imbalance between grassland and tillage. Nevertheless, it is now clear that the veracity of many of these early yield ratios is suspect. Not only are yields for some demesnes in some years unnaturally high but they are also out of kilter with corresponding price levels. The explanation probably lies in some, as yet unidentified, ambiguity in contemporary accounting procedures which has artificially inflated the harvested totals, such as the lumping of grain received as tithes with that harvested from the demesne.
consistency and reliability eclipses that assembled for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from farm accounts by Michael Turner, John Beckett, and
Bethanie Afton.
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The outline of the paper is as follows. First, the recent literature on the extent of major subsistence crises in pre-industrial England is reviewed (Part II governments themselves were active agents). 18 Analysis of the changing magnitude of year-to-year variations in wheat prices for a sample of ten European cities from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries certainly suggests that from the late fifteenth century markets for the premier bread grain were becoming more integrated. In many of Europe's major maritime cities late-medieval levels of price 18 Persson, Grain Markets, Epstein, Freedom and Growth, 3).
variability had already been substantially reduced by the mid-seventeenth century and by the end of the eighteenth century they had mostly been halved, leaving only limited scope for further reductions following the technological advances of the industrial revolution (Figure 1 ). Price variations in the interior cities of Vienna (where war had a major negative impact on price variations), Strasbourg, and
Madrid remained higher but eventually followed the same trend. Across all ten cities, the magnitude of annual wheat-price variations was at a temporal peak during the first half of the fifteenth century, when grain markets were presumably least integrated. Thereafter, the magnitude of annual wheat-price variations fell to 55 per cent of that peak by the early seventeenth century and then to 30 per cent by the close of the nineteenth century, trends which are consistent with the thesis that grain markets were improving in efficiency.
In London, in contrast to most other major cities, the magnitude of annual wheat-price variations actually increased during the price revolution of the sixteenth century (Figures 1 and 2 ). It then rapidly subsided to a level in the seventeenth century a third lower than that prevailing in the famine-prone early fourteenth century, before declining to a low point at the opening of the twentieth century that was barely a quarter of that prevailing six centuries earlier. and rationalize the need for pro-active public policy in a context where markets still functioned slowly and natural hazards sporadically had a major impact upon the output of staple foodstuffs.
Whether output is measured gross or net of on-the-farm deductions of seed and fodder has a significant bearing upon estimated levels of elasticity. Fogel, as revised by Barquin, relies on late-nineteenth century English agricultural crop yields, which refer to gross output. As Wrigley has noted, whether Davenant's data refer to gross or net output is not quite clear. 31 If (as seems more likely) they are taken to be net of seed requirements, then an estimate based on gross output that assumes an average yield ratio of five-to-one gives an elasticity of -0.31, instead of the -0.40 derived from the same data net of seed (seed ratios of four-to-one and ten-to-one would mean respective gross output elasticities of -0.29 and -0.35).
Barquin's revised elasticity estimate of -0.36 for gross output thus implies an elasticity in excess of Davenant's -0.4 for net output. Both Fogel and Persson use the elasticity measure:
where ε is the price elasticity of demand, and the σs are the standard deviations of output (q) and price (p wheat from French and Swiss tithe data spanning the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries and confirm his conclusion that price elasticities for the gross output of wheat in the early modern period normally lay within the range -0.5 to -0.8.
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Alternatively, Table 2 reports estimates of the elasticity of demand calculated using variants of:
where b is the elasticity. These combine the price series and the net yield data, lagged one year. 37 These elasticities are generally lower than those obtained using wheat, in contrast to an increase in the elasticities of barley and especially oats.
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Perhaps rising living standards in the wake of the Black Death had reduced the demand for barley and oats and thereby raised their income elasticities, although this explanation works better for oats than barley since the latter benefited from a 38 In line with Persson, Grain Markets, "Second Thoughts, , it is assumed here that carry-over stocks of grain were negligible; England's net foreign trade in grain is also assumed to have been negligible in this period.
growing thirst for ale brewed from malted barley. 39 The yield data also confirm that in the worst harvests of all -in the case of wheat, 1316, 1339, 1349, 1350, 1351, 1420, 1438 , and 1477 -less than three-fifths the trend value of the net yield were returned. The effects of such dismal harvests must have been felt throughout the economy and impacted in different ways upon all social classes.
Notwithstanding the concentration upon wheat in much historical analysis, oats and barley were also significant crops in medieval and early modern
England. 40 Both were better suited to brewing than wheat, were staple ingredients of the coarser and cheaper grades of bread, were widely consumed as pottage by the poorer classes, and oats in particular was a staple fodder crop. Whereas wheat was invariably sown in the autumn, most barley and virtually all oats were sown in the spring. These spring grains were therefore largely unaffected by a bad autumn or winter and might even be sown as a replacement for wheat or rye if the latter looked like failing as a result of harsh winter conditions. Since these grains differed in their fertility demands upon the soil, they also formed complementary components of the more elaborate rotations as exemplified by the classic three- and widely traded, nevertheless only oats was capable of being grown in virtually all farming regions since it was tolerant of the widest range of growing conditions.
In fact, in many upland areas it was almost the only grain grown. To overlook the oats harvest is therefore to ignore the nation's most universal cereal. Oats was also far more affordable than wheat and its harvest was consequently more material to the nutrition of the poor.
Sowing wheat in the autumn and almost all oats in the spring also offered a non-negligible element of insurance to cultivators and consumers, as captured by the relatively low, albeit positive, correlation between wheat and oats yields (Table 2) . 41 The correlation between first differences in net yields was +0.06. As is to be expected, year-to-year changes in oats and barley yields were more highly correlated (+0.30). Growing and harvesting conditions had to be exceptionally good or bad for the yields of winter and spring grains to have been similarly affected. Tellingly, the correlation coefficient between oats and wheat yields reaches +0.391 over the watershed period 1314-1351, compared to only +0.169
over the entire period 1269-1480. There is a clear implication that during these years environmental conditions were powerfully in the ascendant with the result that the yields of winter and spring grains became strongly rather than weakly correlated. 42 As a result producers forfeited many of the insurance benefits of cultivating both types of grain; this mattered little when both did well, but a lot when both fared badly. As Table 3 reveals, movements in the prices of the three crops were normally much more highly correlated, suggesting the integration of markets across, and inter-changeability of demand between, cereals. 41 The standard deviation of the unfiltered wheat yield series for the 1270-1475 period is 22.6.
Assuming weights of 0.5 for wheat and 0.25 each for barley and oats produces a standard deviation for 'cereals' of 17.8, or nearly 18 per cent less. 42 Certainly, the variability of yields seems to have shifted over this long period, although not in a simple or consistent way. Wheat yields were subject to greatest variation in the half-century 1350-1399 (when a succession of below average harvests from 1350 to 1375 was succeeded by a run of the most bountiful harvests on record), while barley and oats yields both fluctuated most after 1450 (when the data are at their thinnest and least representative). Yields overall were somewhat more variable in the late thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries than in the first half of the fifteenth century, which might be linked to the mounting instability of weather conditions down to the mid-fourteenth century highlighted in recent environmental research. 52 The increasing unreliability of yields thereafter was especially evident in the case of oats and is in marked contrast to the striking stability of oats yields in the first half of the fourteenth century. While it is tempting to attribute such differences to the influence of the weather, not least because weather conditions seem to have changed in subtle but significant ways over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, climatic differences alone can hardly account for the fact that, as reconstructed from farm-level data, medieval yields of wheat and barley were three times, and medieval oats yields more than four times, as variable as modern (post-1884) English/British yields documented by the official agricultural statistics (Table 4) . the different results that can be obtained when the reliability of harvests is measured at the micro-level of individual production units, and then aggregated, or calculated at the macro-level of the country as a whole using national output statistics. Variations which may seem small and manageable at a macro-level can assume entirely different dimensions at the micro-levels of the individual farm, 53 Barquin, "Elasticity of Demand," p. 258. 55 Wrigley, "Advanced Organic Economy," pp. 445-6, 458-9. 56 Fogel, "Second Thoughts," p. 252 fn. 8. Persson (Grain Markets, p. 113) following a bad year, whether because animals were dead or malnourished, or because farmers themselves were suffering, could reduce yield ratios. Notes: The W-B-O column is a weighted average of net cereal yields, using the ratio 2:1:1.
'Average/Expected' is the ratio of actual to predicted frequency. The predicted frequency is set at the once-off probability of such a shortfall squared or cubed. Yield data from Campbell, Three Centuries. Table 5 : Likelihood of 'back-to-back' harvest failures, England 1268-1480. Table 5 is derived from fitting the medieval wheat, barley, and oats yield data to a Hodrick-Prescott filter and identifying those years with gross and net yields 10, 20, and 30 per cent below trend. Focusing on net yields, between 1268 and 1480 back-to-back shortfalls of over 10 per cent for individual cereals were not unusual, and were somewhat more common than might be expected on the basis of squaring once-off probabilities. For example, the statistical probability of a back-toback shortfall in net wheat yield of 10 per cent or more was one in twelve (0.085), but such shortfalls occurred 14 per cent more often than 'expected'. Note how the likelihood of a serious shortfall was less for oats, the buffer crop of the poor, than the other two cereals. Unsurprisingly, the chance of all three major cereals simultaneously doing badly was lowest of all: the probability of a 10 per cent backto-back shortfall in the net W-B-O yield was one in fifteen (0.066). A failure on such a scale across all crops would almost certainly have led to genuine hardship and malnutrition for many, though hardly classic famine conditions. Back-to-back shortfalls sufficient to result in major famines were much rarer, especially those affecting all three major grains. For wheat and barley consecutive net reductions of a fifth or more were liable to occur only about once every three or four decades, although in this period they also occurred somewhat more often than might be expected if they were purely random. The most dangerous shortfalls of all were double back-to-back (i.e. three-in-a-row) failures of this magnitude but they were 'out-of-the-blue' events likely to occur once in every two or three centuries.
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Evidence on their randomness is mixed; they were more frequent in the case of wheat (gross yield), barley (net yield) and W-B-O (net yield), but not otherwise (Table 5) . 58 Only in the case of net barley yields are any of the entries in the bottom half of Table 4 combined price for these same three grains (inverted and advanced 1 year to bring out the coincidental movement between yields and prices), and Clark's real farmworkers' wage rates (also advanced 1 year). In a period notable for the variability of its yields ( Figure 3 ) the pronounced back-to-back supply-side shocks of 1315-16
and 1349-51 stand out clearly. Moreover, not only was the latter the more prolonged event, but recovery from it was slower since it was not until the late 1370s that yields recovered to the levels recorded on the eve of the crisis.
Nevertheless, the price response to the crisis of 1349-51 was altogether slower and slighter than that of 1315-16, which witnessed the greatest inflation of grain prices during the entire Middle Ages and arguably the greatest on English historical record. 61 During the earlier of these two crises the scarce grain, reduced agricultural employment, and sky-high food prices had squeezed the entitlements of wage earners hard, and the real wage rates of English farm workers sank to their lowest recorded point ever.
62 That this had tragic consequences for many of those dependent upon their wages for their livelihoods is implied by the fact that in the wake of the crisis nominal wages registered a modest rise, probably because famine mortality had thinned the ranks of laborers. As well as the accounts of contemporaries, who were in no doubt that England and much of northern Europe were in the grip of dire famine, all the classic economic symptoms of famine may be observed during these grim years: rural credit arrangements collapsed triggering a wave of petty land sales, many also traded parcels of land for food; those who had exhausted or forfeited their legal entitlements to food resorted to theft and crimes against property soared; rural to urban migration increased in a 61 Campbell, "Nature Whereas the catalysts of the greatest historical food availability declines may have lain for the most part within the natural world, their impacts and consequences patently owed a great deal to prevailing socio-economic conditions. 67 Campbell, "Physical Shocks."
For this reason subsistence crises and famines tended to cluster in periods when society at large was particularly vulnerable to scarcity, as in the first halves of both the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. Periods of greater prosperity were not immune to famine -witness the 1430s and 1740s -if the environmentally induced food availability decline was great enough, but these famines rarely matched in hardship those of the periods of greatest economic austerity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Newly available yield data endorse Persson's view that in England, as in most of Europe, until at least the end of the Middle Ages, and probably for far longer, major food availability declines underpinned many if not necessarily all episodes of pronounced grain-price inflation. Pre-industrial European price elasticities of grain
were not low and are likely to have been significantly higher in the medieval and early modern periods than in the late nineteenth century when official agricultural statistics first become available. Indeed, national statistics undoubtedly understate the magnitude of the local and regional variations in output which brought so much hardship to pre-modern populations. On the evidence of micro-level data, between 1268 and 1480 net grain-yield reductions in excess of one-fifth were not unusual and in the worst harvests of all mean reductions of more than two-fifths are recorded, while even greater reductions for individual crops were not unknown.
The most dangerous food availability declines, however, were those which resulted from back-to-back harvest failures of all the major crops, and these were far less frequent, occurring perhaps once a generation or less. Harvest failures on the scale of 1315-17 or 1349-51 were once in 200-year events, hence the occurrence of two such harvest disasters within the narrow space of a single generation prompts speculation as to whether there was an element of autocorrelation in the precipitating environmental causes.
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That prices are an inadequate surrogate for direct evidence of harvests is confirmed. As the triple harvest failure of 1349-51 demonstrates, not all major food availability declines triggered inflationary price spikes and, conversely, not all inflationary prices spikes resulted from food availability declines. At this early stage of economic and agrarian development and state formation, with its imperfect markets and selective and voluntary welfare provision, recurrent harvest shortfalls were an inescapable fact of life which delivered profits to the prosperous and hardship, malnutrition, and even death to the needy. Five centuries later, thanks to the efforts of English farmers, grain harvests were both substantially heavier and significantly less variable. Across Europe there is evidence that from the sixteenth century improved integration of grain markets was dampening down the scale of year-to-year price variations so that in England the magnitude of grain price variations during the 'cold' seventeenth century was significantly less than during the 'unstable' fourteenth century. Following the run of bad harvests in the 1590s, a nation-wide system of public poor relief was put in place which better protected the food entitlements of the most vulnerable in hard times and governments became 68 Campbell, "Physical shocks." more pro-active in attempting to guarantee the nation's grain supply and maintain public order in hard times. The last harvest failure to elevate deaths above births occurred in the 1740s, precipitated by some of the most extreme and abnormal environmental conditions of the second millennium A.D. Nevertheless, the greater resilience of English society ensured that the crisis was on a smaller scale than in those other European countries still vulnerable to such extreme shocks. Thereafter, serious harvest shortfalls ceased to present a serious economic and demographic threat and became more a source of public disorder than of excess mortality, assuming an importance to the civil authorities which they had never possessed in the Middle Ages.
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Whereas England was haunted by famine in the Middle Ages, it had already largely banished that specter by the time it embarked upon its industrial revolution and Malthus wrote his Essay. This was a signal achievement and contributed materially to the well being of the humblest members of society. It owed little to any exogenous change in the incidence or magnitude of the environmental hazards with which agricultural producers in all periods had to contend and a very great deal to the improved capacity of governments, markets, welfare institutions and society at large to cope with those hazards and the harvest shortfalls which they continued to deliver. 69 Randall and Charlesworth, Moral Economy; Randall, Riotous Assemblies.
